On August 9, 2020, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus declared victory in the country’s presidential election after a chaotic summer marred by deepening economic crisis, political repression, and a severe mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, factors which together presented a perfect storm for rising popular discontent. Widely condemned as a fraudulent election by independent election monitors and democratic nations, Lukashenka’s claim that he had won with 80.23% of the vote over his rival Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya spurred protests that quickly eclipsed the size of those that had occurred throughout the summer. Law enforcement in Belarus responded to these protests with violence: police and military deployed stun grenades and batons to arrest and detain protestors. Yet the crackdown on protests had the opposite effect intended by the regime, as more and more people flooded the streets to form Belarus’s largest protest to date. Over subsequent weeks and months, mobilization in Belarus only continued to grow, with hundreds of thousands of protestors risking imprisonment, injuries, and potentially their lives to fight against repression and for democracy.

​

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This unprecedented mobilization that Belarus has experienced since the August presidential election—the strongest challenge to Lukashenka since he assumed the presidency in 1994— raises important questions about the political trajectory of the country. Many journalists and scholars have attempted to answer perhaps the most obvious ones: will the protests topple Lukashenka? Will the protests foster democracy in Belarus? Yet, in this article, I take a different approach. Rather than speculating about democratization, I address the topic of generational political attitudes. In Belarus, age has traditionally served as one of the most important explanatory variables when evaluating differences in political attitudes, including views of democracy and the West as well as support for the Lukashenka regime. Those who lived under the Soviet Union (the older generations) are more likely to support the regime, and those who have not experienced life in the Soviet Union are more likely to support democratic reforms. Yet, on-the-ground news coverage of the recent protests has demonstrated that it is not just young people who are protesting; in fact, there has even been a surge in anti-regime and anti-violence “pensioners’ marches,” often led by Belarusian grandmothers. As such, it becomes necessary to ask: has mass mobilization in Belarus affected generational political attitudes? If so, why, and in what ways? 

​

In order to address these fundamental questions, I will leverage survey data, qualitative interviews, and existing news coverage. During the summer of 2020, I interned with the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) in Berlin and analyzed raw data from a series of surveys that the organization had conducted on young people in Belarus in February 2019, February 2020, and June 2020. The organization also recently conducted a survey in December 2020 that has yielded some preliminary results. I will reference data from these surveys throughout this paper. In addition, I will reference three qualitative interviews. The first is with a young Belarusian protestor, who will remain anonymous and be referred to by the pseudonym “Ivan.” The second interview is with Dr. Félix Krawatzek, a Senior Researcher at ZOiS, and the third was with Dr. John O’Loughlin, Professor of Geography at University of Colorado, Boulder, who has researched and written about generational political attitudes and mobilization in Belarus. Finally, I will draw on existing news coverage as primary source material. The recency of the election as well as the political sensitivity of the situation mean that, at the time of writing, robust academic data revealing generational political attitudes is not available to the extent that it is for the pre-election environment. Nevertheless, I will produce an analytical argument in response to the question that I have posed based on the evidence gleaned from my aforementioned methodologies. 

​

Ultimately, I argue that the surge in mobilization in Belarus and the Lukashenka regime’s subsequent response to the mobilization has expanded the anti-regime coalition by eroding Lukashenka’s support among the older generation (to what extent that support has been eroded will need to be evaluated once more data is available). I will begin by providing context on generational political cleavages in Belarus, with particular emphasis on the legacy of the Soviet experience. I will emphasize that while a significant generational gulf does exist, there is intra-generational variation that must be taken into account; neither young or old people in Belarus are totally uniform in their views. I will proceed by describing how the Lukashenka regime’s inability to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic decline primed Belarus for popular political realignment. Next, I will turn to the protests themselves, using qualitative evidence from interviews and news coverage to illustrate how the demographics of protestors changed and explaining how repression and police brutality aided in expanding the anti-regime coalition, including older generations. I will conclude by summarizing my argument and making suggestions for further research.

 

The Soviet Legacy & Generational Political Cleavages in Belarus

 

The Primary Generational Divide

​

The primary Belarusian political cleavage that I will consider in this analysis is that between the so-called “Soviet generation” and the “post-Soviet generation.” The term “Soviet generation” refers to those who grew up under the Soviet Union, whereas the “post-Soviet generation” refers to those born after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1990, or those who did not become adults during the period. So, what does this generational political divide look like and why does it exist?

​

Survey data helps provide an overview of the differences in political attitudes between the Soviet and post-Soviet generations. In particular, Dr. O’Loughlin, alongside Dr. Gerard Toal of Virginia Tech and Dr. Kristin Bakke of University College London, conducted a survey in January 2020 that proves particularly insightful on this topic, describing a “huge generational rift” in Belarus. For example, they find that while 55% of Belarusians ages 18-30 said that Belarus is headed in the wrong direction, only 22% of Belarusians over 60 say the same. Chart A demonstrates the downward trend in the belief that Belarus is headed in the wrong direction across all age groups. Another question (see Chart B) asks Belarusians about the “best” political system; Western democracy was overwhelmingly cited by younger Belarusians, whereas older Belarusians preferred the Soviet system. Notably, support for Western democracy and values among young Belarusians is not a new phenomenon. A national survey conducted in Belarus in 1997 resulted in approximately 54% of younger respondents signaling their support for democracy. The survey also demonstrated that merely 7% of young people desired a return to a planned economy, in contrast with 18% of the general population. The generational political divide between young and old citizens on these crucial questions of governance and politics is cited by both Dr. Krawatzek and Dr. O’Loughlin as the widest in magnitude among all post-Soviet countries.

​

Chart A

​

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

However, in the words of Dr. O’Loughlin, the “one thing that’s key to everything in terms of attitudes towards politics and towards life, really,” is the question asking respondents whether or not the end of the USSR was the right or wrong step. The response to this question (see Chart C) reveals a dramatic discrepancy between the oldest and youngest members of Belarusian society: those between 31 and 45 and overwhelmingly those above 46 believe it was the wrong step, whereas those between 18 and 30 are more likely to say it was the right one. This is further illuminated by data from a ZOiS survey from 2019 showing that 60% of Belarusians ages 18-34 say that the 2000s were the “best era to be a young person.” Belarusian young people view their quality of life and potential opportunities as greater in the present than during Soviet times, which informs their propensity to say that the end of the Soviet Union was a positive development. On the other hand, older Belarusians who may be struggling economically in the present might desire elements of “social stability and a certain minimum of social welfare provision” that they experienced under the Soviet Union.

​

​

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

​

This “Soviet nostalgia,” explains, in large part, the generational political divide seen in Belarus. Recent research by Ian McAllister and Stephen White shows that older age is a statistically significant predictor of Soviet nostalgia, and that this form of Soviet nostalgia is a statistically significant predictor of support for Lukashenka. Interestingly, their research shows that it is only in Belarus that Soviet nostalgia increases the popularity of the leader. While they do not offer an explanation for this phenomenon, the implication is that Soviet nostalgia might serve as a larger obstacle to democratization in Belarus than in other countries. This perspective is substantiated by the fact that Dr. O’Loughlin and Dr. Krawatzek both found Belarus to be the post-Soviet country with the most Soviet nostalgia. Dr. O’Loughlin further attests to the fact that the generational gap with respect to views on politics is widest in Belarus, which he attributes at least in part to the lack of other significant cross-cutting cleavages (like ethnic divisions in Ukraine or Georgia, for instance). Possessing other cross-cutting cleavages translates into political divides along alternate demographic lines. Yet the lack of other significant cleavages, the most salient of which might be ethnicity, lends greater political import to Soviet nostalgia and its subsequent impact on shaping differences in political views between young and old people.

​

As a former state farm manager, Lukashenka has certainly played into Soviet nostalgia in order to retain support. His decisions, including adopting a Soviet-like flag in 1995, ridiculing modern technologies (he called the Internet “an information garbage heap”) and embracing a strongman style of rule, may appeal to older Belarusians nervous about a changing world who can find comfort in the stability provided by a more authoritarian government. As Ivan points out, young people are less comfortable with Lukashenka’s style of rule because they did not live under the Soviet Union; lacking firsthand experience, they have no pre-existing positive associations with living under that type of government. While older people assess the present and future through “the prism of their own past,” youth assess the present and the future through the lens of their “aspirations and expectations.” Greater interactions with Western culture and values will continue to shape and inform the aspirations and expectations of the post-Soviet generation, manifesting in different political attitudes than their elders.

 

Intra-Generational Differences and Inter-Generational Similarities

​

Before diving into the implications of the generational political divide, it is important to recognize that neither the Soviet generation nor the post-Soviet generation are uniform in their views, nor are they divided on every issue. 

​

For instance, Dr. Krawatzek highlights the diversity of experience of young people in Belarus, noting that those who have had “the capability to go abroad, the possibility to learn a foreign language, [the opportunity to have] done internships or studies abroad” possess a “different outlook to those who’ve stayed in the country.” In essence, young people who have had more interaction with the West are more likely to internalize Western values, including democracy, and wish to see them present at home. Therefore, although Dr. Krawatzek does note that “young people [have] mostly rejected” the “Soviet façade” to which the older generation has more naturally accepted, he provides an important reminder not to “put the young people all into one box.”

Secondly, there are significant points of agreement between generations in Belarus. Specifically, young people largely express similar opinions as their elders on social and cultural issues. Dr. O’Loughlin highlights same-sex marriage as a key example: according to their survey, in Belarus, 95% of people think that marriage should be between a man and a woman. The difference between the younger and older generation on this topic is only around 5-7%. Furthermore, according to their data, young people are just as religious as their elders.

Keeping in mind these intra-generational differences and inter-generational similarities is critical. They provide important nuance to any analysis of generational political attitudes in Belarus. Nevertheless, as highlighted previously, a broad and significant generational divergence on key political issues persists. 

 

Varying Acceptability of Lukashenka’s Social Contract

​

Ultimately, the difference in generational political attitudes fosters different expectations between young and old Belarusians about the kind of government and type of society that they want or accept. Naturally, as younger Belarusians are more familiar with Western values, whether as a result of social media or Western education, they are more likely to favor politically and economically liberalizing reforms in Belarus than their older counterparts. For example, many young Belarusians have benefited from the development of the IT sector in the country, which is perceived “by many as the main if not only means of social advancement” in Belarus. 

On the other hand, Soviet-nostalgic older Belarusians are less reluctant to embrace Western ideas or technologies and may be more inclined to fall back on a Soviet-style state-run economy, which Lukashenka has promoted over the course of his decades-long rule. For instance, Dr. Krawatzek notes that Lukashenka’s government has, in large part, rejected attempts to “modernize the economy [and] infrastructure,” resulting in the persistence of large, state-run plans from the Soviet era. In exchange for maintaining government control over the economy, as well as Belarusian society, Lukashenka’s regime has offered access to healthcare, education, public infrastructure, and other social commodities that the Soviet generation may fear losing otherwise. In response to Western critics who may be bewildered by these attitudes, Dr. O’Loughlin points out that the Soviet generation experienced immense “instability and chaos and uncertainty” during the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, their proclivity toward a social contract entailing the exchange of political freedoms for security may be widely appealing. As Ivan explains, “for the people born in the Soviet Union and for the people conditioned to this type of government, that was okay.”

 

COVID-19, Economic Crisis & Protests

​

Although fundamental generational political divisions have existed for years, political engagement and opposition activity across all ages has historically been severely limited. Dr. Krawatzek provides important insight on the limited nature of political engagement among even young Belarusians, highlighting that “the political system just hasn’t known change, and that’s quite important for whether young people think about politics as being A) interesting and B) something where things can develop.” He added, “if it’s always the same person that is elected with an overwhelming majority” and sporadic movements against that rule were “violently beaten down,” Belarusians simply might not regard the political environment as having potential for change. 

Ivan gives additional context to Dr. Krawatzek’s analysis, discussing the rare displays of civil society that took place in the past. He describes, “There was this silent protest where people would clap in the center of the city and they were arrested for it, hundreds of people. Then, after that, they were all sent to 10 days or so in prison. I remember watching the news and it would be very absurd. You know, one-handed men would be arrested for clapping and the deaf person would be arrested for yelling. The court would actually say, ‘okay, you don't have two hands, right? You're a one-handed guy, but you were clapping with a political context.’” Through sheer repression, Lukashenka successfully stifled opposition sentiment and imbued the political environment with a sense of hopelessness, discouraging individuals from seeking to make change. 

​

That is, until 2020. Over the course of the year, political activity and involvement increased dramatically even before the massive post-election protests. For instance, ZOiS data shows that the percentage of Belarusians aged 18-34 who consider themselves interested in politics skyrocketed from 40% in both February 2020 to 58.3% in June 2020. A confluence of interrelated factors contributed to this surge in political interest and activity, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, economic crisis, and increasing frustration with Lukashenka’s political tactics. These factors set the stage for the explosion of mobilization that would ensue after the fraudulent election.

 

Backdrop of Economic Crisis in Belarus, Exacerbated by COVID-19

​

Lukashenka’s unwillingness to adapt Belarus’s economy (“the most unreformed in Europe”) or changing global financial circumstances has led the country to face a variety of severe economic challenges, which have only been exacerbated by COVID-19. For instance, in order to hold up his end of the social contract, one of Lukashenka’s fundamental policies has been to ensure that state company-employed workers receive a monthly wage of approximately 500 USD. However, this policy renders Belarus vulnerable to frequent currency collapses as the economic growth produced by the planned economy is often insufficient to fund these wages. Perhaps the most dramatic crisis occurred in 2011 and resulted in Belarus accepting a Russian bailout worth billions of dollars. Moreover, over-dependence on Russia is a key characteristic of Belarus’s economy more generally, as Belarus has traditionally been buoyed by Russia’s provision of cheap gas and oil imports. In a 2011 analysis, Dr. Julia Korosteleva, currently an Associate Professor of Business Economics at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, argues that the global economic recession exposed structural deficiencies in the Belarusian economy, characterizing the Belarusian government as the “hostage of their own rigid economic policies” and contending that at least some privatizing or economically liberalizing restructuring must occur in order to “avert economic collapse.”  

​

Economic growth in Belarus since 2011 has primarily been a product of Russian subsidies; thus, when Russia experienced an economic crisis in 2014, it carried over into Belarus. The period between 2014 and 2019 in the country has seen an average GDP per capita growth rate of 0%. Moreover, reliance on Russia has proven problematic for Belarus because of Russia’s political ambitions, including Putin’s suspected goal of eventual annexation. In order to increase the chances of this, and manage domestic economic problems, Russia has continued to raise the prices of the oil that it trades to Belarus. As a result, the Belarusian economy was already struggling at the beginning of 2020, long before the deadly global pandemic struck. 

 

Introduction of COVID-19 and Government Response

​

Thus, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic served to fuel an already growing political and economic fire. The obvious economic complications of the pandemic were worsened by Lukashenka’s refusal to take it seriously. Instead of adopting the requisite public health measures, he encouraged Belarusians to go enjoy “hockey, vodka, and [the] banya.” Meanwhile, Belarusian citizens grew increasingly concerned about the disease. As illustrated in Chart D, over half of Belarusians aged 18-34 disagreed with the government’s lax policies on the pandemic. Moreover, only 5% of respondents agreed with Lukashenka that the virus was “exaggerated.”

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regression analysis of the question presented in Chart D shows that those who consume state-run media were more likely to agree with the government’s COVID-19 response (see Table A). Importantly, however, reliance on state-run media was already low with young people (see Chart E) and, though state-run media was and is still likely consumed by older individuals, there is reason to believe that many older people have lost faith in it. Ivan said, “no one was reading the news reports before. You just don’t care. The news is not the thing for you. And when you are ambivalent about what's going on, but then you start reading: 900, 1000, 1200, 2000 sick people a day. You start following it.” Moreover, as people were seeing others become sick around them, particularly the elderly, the state-run media’s argument that COVID-19 was exaggerated became a form of “cognitive dissonance.” In fact, a survey run by King’s College London demonstrated that by September, a significant majority (85%) of those 18-34 and a slight majority (52%) of those above 55 does not consume or disregards state-run media entirely, a trend that is consistent across regional, job, and educational lines. Qualitative interviews run by the researchers who conducted the survey overwhelmingly suggested that although the protests and ensuing repression caused a turn away from the state-run media, the initial impetus for many was Lukashenka’s rhetoric about coronavirus. Fewer people consuming the state-run media translated into fewer people being fed Lukashenka’s narratives, whether about coronavirus or later, about the protests.

 

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The above table presents the results of a multiple linear regression model I created demonstrating that use of state media is a statistically significant predictor of support for Belarus’s lax COVID-19 policies. Older age is also a predictor, although this data only includes young Belarusians, or those aged 18-34. Greater wealth and not living in the capital also have slight associations with supporting the policies. The regression analysis uses ZOiS survey data from June 2020.
 

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Finally, COVID-19 also sparked a greater sense of cross-generational solidarity that has continued into the protests in the late summer and fall of 2020. Dr. Krawatzek says, “Young people have older relatives and friends, but primarily of course, parents, grandparents, and saw them falling ill, and even dying. So that therefore not only had an impact on the older generation, but also on the younger generation of thinking, ‘you know, this regime promises security and stability, and it doesn't provide any of that.’” Moreover, the government’s failure to coordinate effective public health measures spurred grassroots organizing. Ivan says that a relative of his, who is a doctor, was not even provided with a mask from the government and had to obtain one on his own. Dr. Krawatzek discusses how many Belarusians have dealt with this failure: “So you've seen a lot of grassroots initiatives too, like fundraising for masks to provide PPE for hospital staff or shops that decided themselves that it's now compulsory to wear a mask.” 

​

This challenges the existing social contract because, as Dr. Krawatzek notes, in Belarus it implied:

 

“‘You don’t need to think, we tell you what to do, and then you’re going to be fine. We’re going to protect you because that's the deal that we have.’ But in a context where the regime doesn’t protect, people started to think for themselves. The pandemic really made that a necessity, and I think that’s part of a really important learning process. ‘We can sort out our district or our village to make it COVID-safe.’”

 

The pandemic not only exposed Lukashenka’s incompetence, but required Belarusians to organize, collaborate, and innovate. Building these solidarity networks and initiatives invigorated civil society in the country, preparing protestors to mobilize leading up to and in the aftermath of the election.

 

Facilitating Protests, Government’s Increasing Repressions

​

The anti-Lukashenka energy building as a result of burgeoning economic problems and  COVID-19 was further compounded by Lukashenka’s repressive political tactics. Political opposition activity had begun to build in Belarus at the beginning of the summer; as Dr. Krawatzek describes, people were “rallying around candidates and collecting signatures,” grassroots energy which was relatively unprecedented in Belarus. Lukashenka’s response to the growing opposition movement was to imprison two front-running opposition candidates, Viktar Babaryka and Siarhei Tsikhanouski, and prevent another, Valery Tsapkala, from registering to run. Tsikhanouski’s wife, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, registered to run shortly after her husband’s arrest, but Lukashenka refused to take seriously a female opposition candidate, who he believed would “collapse” in office. 

​

Protests were growing before the July 14 release of the official list of candidates, which permitted only Tsikhanouskaya to run, but Dr. Krawatzek identifies it as “a mobilizing moment and a critical juncture wherein it was unclear for a few days where things would land.” Then, the support around Tsikhanouskaya became “very clear.” Lukashenka’s sexist assumption that Belarus was not “mature” enough to have a woman as president was swiftly rejected by Belarusian society, as momentum around Tsikhanouskaya continued to build. Tens of thousands of Tsikhanouskaya supporters came together in Minsk during the weeks ahead of the August election, but protests and marches also coalesced in smaller towns and villages throughout the country, an important signal of the increasingly widespread nature of opposition energy. Regression analysis of ZOiS data showed that while support for opposition was indeed higher in June among younger and more politically interested Belarusians, education, wealth, and gender did not exhibit any correlation with support for opposition. This further supports the existence of a broad opposition coalition that was continuously building over the summer. 

​

Increasing economic woes, frustration with the mismanagement of COVID-19, and grassroots organizing sparked by the pandemic as well as Lukashenka’s authoritarian campaign primed Belarus for the massive mobilization that would soon occur shortly after the election. Ivan aptly describes the summer before the August presidential election as a “boiling pot, where you could see the steam coming out of it.” Then, “the cap just went off.”

 

The Election, Mass Mobilization, and State Violence

 

The Election and The Protests

​

After a summer of mounting tensions, Lukashenka’s rigged re-election triggered opposition activity unlike ever before seen in Belarus. People poured into the streets to protest Lukashenka and in support of Tsikhanouskaya. While data is still emerging on the demographics of post-election protests, it appears that young people were at the forefront in the immediate aftermath of the election. Dr. Krawatzek explains that young people were “ready to take the risk” of protesting and that their digital connectedness likely facilitated their decisions to take to the streets. He also notes that during an Internet shutdown in the aftermath of the election, many young people were propelled into the street simply from a desire to understand what was going on.

​

Young people, less burdened by the memory of the Soviet past and capitalizing on a newfound hope for the future, took this risk because they believed that their country was worth fighting for. For example, Ivan describes feeling “cheated” in response to the election, saying “I'm a young person, right? I want to have my future here. I am cheated at the same time. I'm not being provided with the level of economic growth promised. And I have absolutely no ability to influence it.” Another young Belarusian protestor, Vlad, says, “I have lived with Lukashenka all my life. I feel like his regime is choking me.” He has taken to the streets in order to “protect” Belarus and ensure free elections.

​

Faced with unprecedented opposition, Lukashenka decided to crack down even more dramatically. He ordered police to use grenades as well as beat and detain protestors. Ivan tells the story of his friend’s brother, who was forced out of his car, beaten, driven to the detention center, forced to stand next to a wall for five hours, and beaten again until he lost consciousness. Ivan continues, “he just woke up in the hospital with huge bruises all over him. And now he is very anxious, always irritable. He lashes out in anger quite often.” Ivan’s friend’s brother is only one of the thousands of young people who have experienced immense violence at the hands of the police as a result of this crackdown. Yet violence does not only impact the individual; it impacts that individual’s friends and family, their parents and their grandparents. It leaves scars on bodies and scars on communities. When asked about how the protests evolved over time, Dr. Krawatzek explained that as weeks passed since the election, the “movements were building momentum and the base became even wider,” at least partially “in response to the violence the young people experienced.” 

​

Viral videos released of the violence and repression circulated throughout Belarus and the world, propelling even more people to the streets and leading to general strikes among some of Lukashenka’s purportedly most reliable supporters, like factory workers. The demographics of the protests have shifted as well. For example, women have taken on a powerful organizing role, including by planning women’s marches and even working together to form human shields to take advantage of the optics of hyper-masculine riot police beating women. In addition, as Dr. Krawatzek notes, “it’s increasingly older people as well,” who also possess a sort of “degree of protection” in a way that younger people do not. Rather than stamping out protests, the increased state violence served to broaden the opposition coalition to include Belarusians across age, occupation, and gender lines. 

 

The Impact of Police Brutality and The Breaking of a Social Contract

​

By using brutal repression to maintain power, Lukashenka shattered the social contract that had placated many Belarusians, especially older ones, for decades. The violence his regime perpetrated against protestors shocked Belarusians of all ages, and has widened the opposition coalition by reducing his support among older Belarusians and decreasing national generational divides.  

​

News coverage of the protests in Belarus reflects the increased role of older people in government opposition. In fact, many elderly Belarusians have organized “pensioners’ marches,” during which they demand an end to the violence and an end to Lukashenka’s rule. Conceptualizing these protests as “pensioners’ marches”' is a particularly effective strike at Lukashenka considering pensioners have traditionally composed much of his support base. It also undermines Lukashenka’s attempts to characterize the protests as reflecting only a small segment of Belarusian society. In an expression of cross-generational solidarity, elderly Belarusian women held flowers and signs that read “the grandmas are with you (protestors).”

​

Why did elderly Belarusians take to the streets? The most compelling explanation is the brutal violence used by the Lukashenka regime. Ivan explains that “before this violence took place, Lukashenka could always frame protests as people just not being satisfied with what they have,” a narrative which might fall on deaf ears among a Soviet-nostalgic generation seeking fundamental social security measures. Ivan describes protests before the post-election violence as “abstract,” in which younger people called for things like “having influence over the government or a voice,” which, again, did not resonate with an older generation that had no experience with such things. When Lukashenka decided to exact violence against protestors, the situation became much less abstract and much more real. Ivan argues, “it could be a 70-year old grandma who supported Lukashenka and thought that her grandchildren wanted too much. But then, if she sees a picture of a guy without a leg and says, ‘this guy [a riot police officer] did it and he’s not going to be punished for it because he is upholding Lukashenka’s regime,’ that has an impact.” 

​

Not only was this violence gruesome and unacceptable in and of itself, but it also violated the basic social contract that upheld Lukashenka’s legitimacy among the Soviet generation. Whereas before, Ivan notes, Belarusians could be mildly satisfied with workable healthcare in the country as a symbol of the prosperity Lukashenka was supposed to provide in exchange for political silence, after August 9th Belarusians would see a “sky lit up by flash grenades.” Moreover, “if you’re a grandma who thinks, ‘oh, I have good healthcare and stability.’ You do not have stability anymore. You have explosions right next to your door, and the reason for these explosions is the government who is supposed to be providing you with the stability that you valued so much.” Meanwhile, this is also occurring at the hands of a government that has ignored and ridiculed a global pandemic that poses a unique threat to the elderly population. 

​

Ivan’s analysis of the situation is supported by interviews with elderly Belarusians themselves. While some noted that they had been politically engaged before 2020, others described their activation as a very recent development. For instance, Larisa Koval, 68, said that “she had little interest in politics” before witnessing blatant vote-rigging on Election Day. Larisa helped hide a young protestor from the police during the immediate aftermath of the election and participates in marches despite personal health problems because she wants to end what she perceives as Lukashenka’s “desperate clinging onto power.” Another elderly Belarusian, Halina Lahatskaya, says that her 94-year-old father, who had been a consistent Lukashenka supporter, has even thrown his support behind Tsikhanouskaya. Vital Ravinski, 75, demonstrates the cross-generational solidarity emerging in Belarus, explaining his decision to protest so that his “children and grandchildren have a good life.” He characterizes the behavior of the riot police as “madness” that has fueled him to keep attending protests until he is murdered. Nina Bahinskaya, 73, describes a crucial element of older Belarusians’ motivation for taking to the streets: she noticed “the riot police more rarely beat protestors when they see elderly people among them.”

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A common theme of outrage against the treatment of young Belarusians largely drives older Belarusians’ activism. Many of the pensioners’ marches have featured portraits and chants honoring the slain opposition activist Raman Badarenka, who was killed by the Belarus police. The centrality of this messaging in the protests demonstrates how resistance to police brutality has become a rallying point and source of motivation for a population often sidelined during political activism. Davidzon argues that the “unspoken social contract” in Belarus has been “irrevocably broken by the violence and the trauma inflicted on the population” over the past few months. 

 

While it is too early to say what will happen next, or if Lukashenka will continue losing support among even his most dedicated base, it seems likely that those older Belarusians he has lost will not easily return to his camp. Preliminary data from a new ZOiS survey of Belarusians aged 16-64 indicates that age is no longer a significant predictor of support for the Lukashenka regime. Dr. Krawatzek notes that unlike factors like education, sex, and place of residence, “there is no systematic relationship” between age and support. This is particularly groundbreaking given that, as previously discussed, age has been traditionally conceived as the most significant predictor of political attitudes in the country. Moreover, approximately 80% of Belarusians who indicated that they had participated in protests identified the violence used against protestors as a key reason for their decision to get involved, lending further support to my argument. It is important to note that the 19.7% of respondents who indicated that they “completely opposed” the protests did tend to be those of older age. However, this could simply reflect a hardening of Lukashenka’s most fervent supporters, who are already likely to be older, rather than evidence for no shift in generational political attitudes at all. It is unreasonable to expect that the protests would have swayed everyone, but there is certainly enough evidence to support the notion of an expanding and age-inclusive anti-regime coalition.

​

  Lukashenka exposed what he was willing to sacrifice–the dignity and lives of Belarusian citizens–in order to hold onto power. By breaking this most fundamental component of any social contract, Lukashenka has lost legitimacy and will continue to experience intense opposition however long he is in power. 

 

Conclusion

​

As of February 2021, Belarus remains embroiled in a cycle of political dissent and brutal repression that is, at its core, a power struggle over the future of a nation. In many ways, young people have led the charge against Lukashenka, but the unprecedented cross-generational, cross-gender and cross-occupational coalition that the opposition has built has transformed the protests from what could have been a temporary moment of resistance into a sustained movement. 

​

In this article, I have examined how and why generational political attitudes have changed as a result of the events of 2020, from the outbreak of COVID-19, to an illegitimate election, to extreme police violence. I have argued that the generational political cleavages are primarily a result of the existence of Soviet nostalgia in the older generation, but that COVID-19 and a context of economic problems put Lukashenka’s social contract with the Soviet nostalgics into jeopardy during the leadup to the presidential election. Through his actions, including blatant rigging of the election and ordering intense violence against protestors, Lukashenka went a step too far in violating the already fraying Belarusian social contract. This allowed for a dramatic expansion of the anti-regime coalition as many older Belarusians, shocked by the violence and left reeling from the instability, turned against Lukashenka and took to the streets. Now that Lukashenka has exposed his willingness to trade his citizens’ physical security for power, he has sacrificed the steadfast political support that has kept his regime stable for decades. 

​

Determining the particular extent to which generational political attitudes have shifted in Belarus requires further research. Available ZOiS survey data from December is a good start, and social scientists should continue to use qualitative and quantitative means to illuminate how much support Lukashenka has lost in the Soviet generation and for what reasons. More research will provide further evidence to substantiate or counter the argument I have presented in this article. Moreover, the events of Belarus provide an important opportunity to study how demographic political cleavages change in the context of instability and mobilization. 

​

Brave Belarusians have put their lives on the line to fight for a better future. It is unclear exactly how the situation will unfold, but documenting, highlighting, and analyzing what has happened thus far represents our best chance at understanding the political dynamics which will inform the trajectory of the country moving forward.